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1
The role of national information in the decision-making process of the Eurosystem has
been a point of controversy in the debate on the new-born institution. On the one hand,
several elements suggest that national developments do not play a signiﬁcant role in shaping
monetary policy decisions. To begin with, strategy is presented in ECB documents as focusing
exclusively on area-wide developments and effects of monetary action, neglecting events in
individual member countries. Other features of the Eurosystem’s communication strategy
also convey the same orientation,
2 which is well summarized by the following President
Duisenberg’statement at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting of
9 September 1999: “... our decisions today, again and as always, were based on a euro area-
wide analysis of economic and ﬁnancial developments — and nothing else” (italics added).
On the other hand, some observers (see, e.g., De Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy, 1999; De
Grauwe, 2000; De Grauwe and Piskorski, 2001) maintain that the prominent role played by
NCB governors within the Governing Council of the Eurosystem is likely, in practice, to give
national developments a greater weight than might be warranted. According to this view,
while the ECB makes every effort to convince the public that only area-wide developments are
relevant to its policy stance, monetary policy decisions are likely to be inﬂuenced, de facto,b y
national interests.
This debate centers on a positive issue. Both parties agree that only area-wide
developments should be relevant, but one argues that, as a matter of fact, national
considerations loom (unduly) large. However, the discussion begs the question of whether
the neglect of information pertaining to the national level is appropriate from a normative
1 The views expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Banca d’Italia. Previ-
ous draftsof the paper were presented at the conferences“Ricerche quantitative per la politica economica - 1999,”
Banca d’Italia-CIDE, Perugia, 15-18 December 1999, “The Euro - What’s in the Future?,” BCI-Greta, Venice,
8-9 June 2000, “The role of policy rules in the conduct of monetary policy,” ECB, Frankfurt, 11-12 March 2002.
We are indebted to Albert Ando, Pietro Catte, Luca Dedola, Riccardo Fiorito, Libero Monteforte, Fabio Panetta,
Paolo Sestito and other participants in the Banca d’Italia-CIDE, BCI-Greta and ECB Conferences for helpful
comments, as well as to Lawrence Christiano and Richard Clarida for stimulating discussions. Any errors are our
own.
2 According to the initial exposition of the ECB strategy “... policy decisions must be made in a manner
that reﬂects conditions across the euro area in its entirety, rather than speciﬁc regional or national developments”
(ECB 1999, p. 47). Also, monetary policy decisions are motivated in terms of economic developments in the area
as a whole, both in the Bulletin and in the press releases following the Governing Council meetings. Furthermore,
the statistical section of the ECB Monthly Bulletin shows only aggregate statistics for the area, with no national
breakdown, except for ﬁscal positions.8
viewpoint. In our opinion, the widespread agreement that national information should, in
principle, play no role in the single monetary policy stems from a failure to distinguish
clearly between objectives (in a formal model, the arguments of the monetary authorities’ loss
function) and the process through which policy decisions are made (the reaction function).
It is far from self-evident that from a normative viewpoint the process through which policy
decisions are made should utterly disregard national developments. Indeed, the appropriate
policy might require that the monetary authorities react to national developments, rather than
(or in addition to) area-wide aggregates, even if their objectives are framed exclusively in area-
wide terms. This may be the case if the economies of the area are characterized by signiﬁcant
structural differences — in particular concerning the monetary transmission mechanism —
and/or are hit by asymmetric shocks. In these circumstances, a given shock may have different
short-term and medium-term effects on the economy of the area depending on which country
is hit ﬁrst or more sharply. The effects of the shock will reﬂect not only the relative importance
ofthatcountry (its relativeGDP), but alsothestructuralrelations that characterizeits economy,
as well as its trade links with the rest of the Union.
3
This paper addresses this normative issue. Taking for granted that the NCB Governors’
interpretation of their role in the Governing Council is consistent with their mandate and thus
corresponds to that recently reasserted by the ECB president,
4 we assess the usefulness of
country-speciﬁc information to monetary policy within a monetary union. In particular, we
ask to what extent and in what manner the Eurosystem should take information at the national
level into account in making its monetary policy decisions; to answer this question, we assess
the cost of disregarding this information or not using it properly.
To this end, we follow the standard approach to policy evaluation recently revived by
a growing literature on monetary policy rules (see. e.g. the contributions in Taylor, 1999):
3 An additional justiﬁcation for the use of country-level information — of a logically different nature —
is provided by cases in which the value of an economic variable of a speciﬁc country is a leading indicator for
area-wide developments. For instance, in spite of its small size, Belgium’s manufacturing survey is considered
a very good leading indicator for area-wide industrial production growth, due to the fact that Belgium is a large
supplier of intermediate goods to the French and German manufacturing industry.
4 “... in a monetary union, there is only one monetary policy, and this must be directed to a single objective.
As laid down in the Treaty, each member of the Governing Council is therefore well aware that he or she is not a
representative of a country or central bank but acts in a personal capacity in deciding the appropriate conduct of
monetary policy for the euro area as a whole.” Press conference following the Governing Council meeting of 30
March 2000.9
we search for reaction functions that minimize the expected value of an intertemporal loss
function, under the constraint provided by a simpliﬁed multi-country model of the euro area.
Assuming that the monetary authority is exclusively interested in area-wide objectives (the
arguments of the loss function are area-wide variables only), we compute and compare the
performance of two classes of simple optimal reaction functions. “Multi country information-
based rules” (MCIB) allow the interest rate to be a function of country-speciﬁc variables (plus
the lagged value of the interest rate to allow for some instrument smoothing). By contrast,
rules in the second class, which we label ”area-wide information-based rules” (AWIB), are
restricted so that their arguments can only be area-wide variables; in other words, the monetary
authority is assumed not to observe country variables separately but only their aggregation. We
then compare the minimized expected loss under the two alternative policy rules, interpreting
the difference as the cost of neglecting country-speciﬁc information. As a benchmark, we
also compute the fully optimal rule (FO) in our linear-quadratic framework (Chow, 1975),
assuming no restrictions on the set of state variables to which the policy maker is allowed to
react.
Let us point out that although the debate summarised above could lead one to think
that national developments should in principle play no role whatsoever in the Eurosystem’s
strategy, there is reason to believe that this may partly reﬂect the Eurosystem’s effort to convey
to the public the idea that its objectives are strictly area-wide. Actually, however, the process
by which decisions are made (the reaction function) does exploit national information — and,
as we have just argued, quite legitimately so. The Eurosystem currently uses a multi-country
approach to the econometric modeling of the area (the ECB uses its own multi-country model,
in addition to an area-wide one, and national econometric models developed and managed
by the NCBs have a prominent role in the forecasting framework); national information is
regularly exchanged and carefully analyzed within the Eurosystem; national statistics are
available earlier than area statistics (which are prepared by Eurostat and by the ECB collecting
the national information) and in many cases represent a more timely complement to the
available area-wide indicators.
5 Thus, our main thesis — that national-level information is
5 It is worth noting that this is not the case in the US, where aggregate data for the entire country are
available before regional data. This aspect is highlighted in reports of Goldman Sachs (1999) and JPMorgan
(1999), which describe how they “create” area-wide statistics for the euro area from the more timely releases of
national statistics.10
relevant to the euro-area policymaking process — may well be less controversial than it may
appear.
It should be acknowledged that the claim of this paper — that the heterogeneity across
euro-area countries warrants consideration of national developments in the implementation
of monetary policy — faces a natural objection. Why are similar concerns not raised for
other monetary unions? The answer, we believe, is that the heterogeneity among the euro-
area countries is, a priori, likely to be larger. The differences in institutional features and
economic structures (e.g. legal system, contract enforcement and corporate law, labor market
arrangements, independent ﬁscal policies) are much more pronounced than in other monetary
unions or federal nations (the US being the most obvious comparison), and are likely to persist
for some time in the future. In addition, convergence of fundamentals (such as the inﬂation
rate, the level of interest rates, the budget deﬁcits and the public debt) has been only a recent
— and in some cases incomplete — achievement; language and cultural differences, tending
to hinder labor mobility, may be a relevant obstacle for the foreseeable future. We therefore
conjecture that the potential loss associated with the neglect of country-speciﬁc information
could be large. At any rate, measuring this loss is precisely our purpose.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes some of the
literature that has dealt with the issue of national vs. aggregate information in a monetary
union. In particular, we brieﬂy discuss the approach in De Grauwe (2000), De Grauwe and
Piskorski (2001), Monteforte and Siviero (2002), whose focus is similar and whose results
are in some cases complementary to ours. Section 3 illustrates the simple euro-area multi-
country model used in the analysis. We restrict our attention to the three main countries —
France, Germany and Italy. This choice is made primarily for practical reasons, but in any
case these countries are broadly representative of the area, accounting for over 70 per cent of
its GDP. Each country is modeled separately (but trade links are allowed for) and the area-
wide variables are obtained ex-post, via aggregation. Sections 4 and 5 describe the setup of
the exercise and report the empirical results. The last section summarizes the preliminary
conclusions and discusses the possible extensions of our research.11
2. Related literature
Several recent papers have dealt with the relevanceof regional information in amonetary
union.
De Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy (1999) concentrate on the possibility that the
members of the ECB Governing Council (all of them or just the NCB Governors) care about
national interests, as opposed to those of the area, and examine the implications for the welfare
of the member countries under different hypotheses on the voting procedures of the Governing
Council.
De Grauwe (2000) uses a simple two-country theoretical model (one Phillips curve for
each country)to analysetwocases. Intheﬁrst, thepolicymakerchooses inﬂationtominimizea
loss function constructed as a weighted average of the two national losses, under the constraint
given by a multi-country model; in De Grauwe’s terminology, in this case the central bank
makes use of national information. In the second exercise, in which the loss function is
deﬁned over area-wide variables and the model is area-wide, the central bank is assumed to
ignore national information. He ﬁnds that in the presence of asymmetries the central bank can
improve monetary policy effectiveness by exploiting national information.
DeGrauwe and Piskorski (2001), sticking to policy rules that are always deﬁned over
national data (i.e., the monetary authority is assumed to react to national information), study
the welfare implications of focusing on national vs. area-wide deﬁnitions of the loss function.
Speciﬁcally, in one case they assume the preferences of the ECB to be a weighted average
of the national loss functions and compute the optimal policy rule that is consistent with
such preferences, under the constraint provided by a multi-country model. Alternatively, they
assume preferences that are in line with the statutory provisions of the ECB and are therefore
based on area-wide aggregates, and again derive the optimal policy rule that is consistent with
such preferences, under the same constraint. Finally, for each choice of the loss function
they compare the performance of the two policy rules; they ﬁnd that in all cases the welfare
differences are small, on the order of 5 to 10 per cent.
The three papers brieﬂy described above are all, in different ways complementary to
our analysis. In particular, De Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy (1999) associate the use of
information about the individual countries with the nationalistic attitude of the Governing12
Council members (and the voting procedure adopted in the Council), while in our paper
the usefulness of this information is examined assuming an area-wide formulation of the
Eurosystem strategy, unambiguously shared by the Council in its entirety. De Grauwe and
Piskorski (2001) always keep the policy rule deﬁned in terms of country-speciﬁc variables,
focusing on how the results are affected by changes in the deﬁnition of preferences.
By contrast, we explore the implications of using and of not using country-speciﬁc
variables in the design of the policy rule, always keeping the loss function deﬁned over area-
wide aggregates. We take their conclusion that only limited welfare differences are discernible
in the cases considered to mean that, once one allows monetary policy to react to country-
speciﬁc variables, the optimal policy is relatively insensitive to changes in the speciﬁcation of
thelossfunction. Thisisfullyconsistentwithourownﬁndingthatthesubstantialimprovement
comes when country-speciﬁc elements are allowed for in the reaction function, even in a
simpliﬁed and constrained form.
Theexercise performedby Monteforteand Siviero (2002)is also complementaryto ours.
They rely on the same three-country model used in this paper and on its area-wide counterpart,
estimated on aggregate data. Assuming a loss function deﬁned over area-wide aggregates,
simple optimal rules (whose arguments are solely aggregate variables) are computed under the
constraint provided by either model. The performance of the rules is then assessed assuming
the multi-country model to be the “true” data generating process.
6 The results show signiﬁcant
welfare losses when the central bank relies on the area-wide model.
Wyplosz (1999) focuses on the problems posed for the ECB by the lack of
synchronisation across EMU economies. He performs two exercises: in the ﬁrst, the ECB
is assumed to set its policy rate using a Taylor rule in which output growth and inﬂation
are weighted averages of the corresponding time-series of the participating countries. In the
second, the output variable is replaced with an index that assigns 50 per cent of the weight
to the average output and 50 per cent to the output of the country that is experiencing a
particularly strong deviation of growth from the average. He ﬁnds that the resulting interest
rate series differ little, both because the interest rate autoregressive coefﬁcient is large and
because the output coefﬁcient in the rule is small.
6 In this framework, as in De Grauwe (2000) and in the present paper, the welfare effects of neglecting
national information are therefore negative by deﬁnition.13
Benigno (1999) analyses monetary policy in a monetary union using a two-region,
general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness, showing that if
the degrees of rigidity are different, policy should assign a greater weight to the region where
rigidity is greater.
3. A small empirical model for the main euro-area economies
The euro-area economy is described by a simple two-equation model for each of the
three main economies (Germany, France and Italy, which account for over 70 per cent of the
area GDP), consisting of an aggregate supply equation (also referred to as Phillips curve) and
an aggregate demand equation (also referred to as IS curve). The ﬁrst equation determines
inﬂation in each country as a function of lagged inﬂation and the output gap in that country,
and of inﬂation “imported” from the other two. The sum of the coefﬁcients on lagged and
imported inﬂation is constrained to be one (a restriction accepted by the data), so that an
accelerationist version of the Phillips curve holds for all countries. The second equation relates
the output gap of each country to its own lagged values and the real interest rate, as well as
to the output gap in the other two countries (a design meant to capture the trade links among
euro area economies).
7 Euro-area GDP and inﬂation are generated via identities, as weighted
averages of the corresponding individual country variables. The output gaps are aggregated
using 1999 GDP weights (under PPP); 1999 consumer spending weights (under PPP) are used
to aggregate the inﬂation rates (for full details as to data construction, see Monteforte (2002)).
As the model allows for simultaneous cross-country linkages, it was estimated with
3SLS. For most of the sample period (from 1978.Q1 to 1998.Q4, totalling 84 observations),
the exchange rates among the German, French and Italian currencies were not ﬁxed,
though constrained by the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System.
Accordingly, the measure of “inﬂation imported in country i from country j” was constructed
a st h es u mo ft h ei n ﬂa t i o nr a t ei nc o u n t r yj and the quarter-on-quarter percentage change in
the exchange rate between the two countries (units of currency of country i needed for 1 unit
of country j’s currency).
8
7 Inﬂation is given by the quarter-on-quarter rate of change in the households’ consumption deﬂator. Po-
tential output was estimated by applying the band-pass ﬁlter (Baxter and King (1995)) to the (log) GDP for each
country.
8 Given the well-known difﬁculties to ﬁnd satisfactory empirical speciﬁcations for the exchange rate, no at-14

























































t+1−k is the quarter-
on-quarter rate of change in the exchange rate between country i and country j (units of
country j’s currency for 1 unit of country i’s currency),
9 y
j
t+1 is the output gap in country
j, i
j
t+1 is the short-term interest rate in country j.
The starting speciﬁcation included, on the right-hand-side of each equation, the ﬁrst
6 lags of all relevant variables. After all insigniﬁcant lags were dropped, the parsimonious
speciﬁcation presented in Table 1 was achieved. This framework is admittedly a very simple
one, as it only models the three major economies in the area, and sketchily at that. While
this choice was made primarily for computational reasons, a full-ﬂedged model for the euro
area including all twelve countries and paying closer attention to country-speciﬁc institutional
features (e.g., labour market arrangements, tax structures, ﬁscal policy mechanisms) would
likely result in more pronounced asymmetries. As the existence of such asymmetries is the
main factor on which our ﬁndings rest, it can be conjectured that our results are likely to
represent a lower bound to the welfare gains from properly exploiting all available national
information.
Some insights into the main properties of the model can be obtained by looking at
a few impulse responses (Figures 1-3).
10 Given our accelerationist version of the Phillips
tempt was made to augment the model with exchange rate equations. However, lagged values of all variables
included in the model were used as instruments for the exchange rates. At any rate, in the experiments pre-
sented below, the percentage change of the exchange rate was set identically equal to zero, consistently with the
introduction of the single currency as of 1 January 1999.






t+1−k are allowed to
differ from one another. The restricted formulation of eq. (1) could not be rejected at the standard conﬁdence
level.
10 In keeping with the approach followed in similar literature, the simulation model does not include any
constant terms, i.e. it may be taken to provide a description of the functioning of the euro-area economy in the
neighborhood of equilibrium. This amounts to implicitly assuming that the same equilibrium values apply to all
countries, acondition that doesnot holdinthe sample period, particularlyregardingthe (implied)equilibrium real
interest rates. It is evident that if we were to assume that the equilibrium interest rates of the individual country15
curve, the model cannot be meaningfully simulated unless it is augmented with a stabilising
monetary policy reaction function. Accordingly, the impulse responses were computed with
an optimised AWIB rule, derived as described in Section 3 below.
A unit shock was given to the stochastic disturbance of each model equation. Thus, the
differences in the responses of the model to aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks in
the various countries reﬂect only the structural differences among the economies in the area.
Monetary policy shocks correspond to a 100-basis-point, one-period increase in the short-term
interest rate.
A few prominent features emerge from the pattern of impulse responses:
– a positive monetary policy shock results in a temporary contraction of output that reaches
a maximum in the second year; it also tends, initially, to affect output more than inﬂation,
which shows the largest reduction three to four years after the shock;
– neither aggregate supply nor aggregate demand disturbances have permanent effects on
output and inﬂation; however, the deviations from equilibrium tend to be remarkably
persistent, at least in some cases;
These features are consistent with well-established stylised facts about the timing of
the impact of a monetary policy shock on output and inﬂation
11. In particular, the general
features of the reaction of inﬂation and the output gap to a monetary policy shock are
remarkably similar to those estimated by van Els, Locarno, Morgan and Villetelle (2001),
on the basis of the econometric models for the various euro-area countries developed and used
by the corresponding NCBs, and the ECB’s Area-Wide Model (see Fagan, Henry and Mestre
models differ from one another, then the welfare gains associated with paying due care to national developments
would likely be even more pronounced. In this respect, our experimental set-up may be viewed, if anything,
as somewhat biased in favour of the AWIB rule. In the model used to compute the impulse responses and the
optimal policy rules, moreover, the rate of change of the bilateral exchange rates is set to zero, given the single
currency. Similarly, while in estimation a measure of country-speciﬁc short-term interest rates was used, in the
experiments below it was imposed that the interest rate be the same for all countries, i.e.: i
j
t+1 = it+1, for all j’s.
11 See, e.g., the evidence presented at the Conference “Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area”,
ECB, Frankfurt, 18-19 December 2001.16
(2001)).
12 Our model thus seems able to reproduce the main features of the monetary policy
transmission mechanisms in reasonably satisfactory fashion.
Looking now more closely at the responses of the model to the shocks, a number of
interesting features can be related to individual countries:
13
– monetary policy takes longer to affect inﬂa t i o ni nF r a n c et h a ni ne i t h e rI t a l yo rG e r m a n y ;
the time-pattern of the effects in the latter two countries is similar, but the effects are
markedly more pronounced in Italy;
– the timing of the effects of monetary policy on the output gap are very similar across
countries. The German output gap is the most reactive, followed by Italy;
– the effects on area-wide inﬂation of shocks hitting the Phillips curve in France tend to
vanish more slowly than in either Italy or Germany;
– similarly for aggregate demand shocks: in the case of France, their effects are much more
persistent, particularly as far as aggregate euro-area inﬂation is concerned;
– the effects of an aggregate demand shock are smallest and least volatile if the shock
originates in Italy;
– by contrast, the effects on the output gap of an aggregate supply shock originating in Italy
are largest and most volatile.
4. Design of the experiments
The analytical framework adopted in this paper is borrowed from the time-honored
Tinbergen-Theil approach to policy-making, recently revived by a strand of the literature
on monetary policy that addresses the issue of whether the performance under simple rules
14
12 At a ﬁrst glance, our results would seem to imply that our MCM results in a considerably slower reaction
of the economy to the monetary policy shock, particularly for inﬂation, than estimated by van Els, Locarno,
Morgan and Villetelle (2001); even more so since they examine the effects of a sustained shock (for 8 quarters)
to the policy interest rate, while our shock is only for one period. However, one should bear in mind that the
simulation experiments in van Els, Locarno, Morgan and Villetelle (2001) do not incorporate a monetary policy
reaction function. In our experiments, given that the model is augmented with a monetary policy rule, the shock
to the policy interest rate is in fact implicitly a sustained one. This goes in the direction of reconciling the two
sets of results, though not entirely.
13 While a case-by-case comparison with other empirical evidence is beyond the scope of this paper, it may
be worth emphasising that most of those individual country features are in accordance with the recent results in
van Els, Locarno, Morgan and Villetelle (2001), which we take as further evidence that our simple MCM may
be deemed to provide a reasonably satisfactory description, for our purposes, of the functioning of the euro area
economy.




of the simple rules is weighted against their simplicity, which can make them easier for the
authorities to use and more useful for communication with the public. Furthermore, simple
rules may be more robust than model-dependent optimal rules. Thus, there may be a trade-off
between performance in the context of a speciﬁc model and robustness.
16
While we share the analytical approach used by this body of literature, our focus
conceptually different. We are not interested in the functional form of the policy rules (e.g.
number of lags, or forward- vs. backward-looking speciﬁcation), or in their robustness;
rather, for a given functional form, we compare the performance of rules that include national
variables among their arguments with that of rules that react only to area-wide variables.
We assume the policymaker’s loss function to be quadratic and time-separable; its
arguments include the deviation of inﬂation from its target value (assumed to be zero), the








t+τ + λ · y
2
t+τ + µ · (∆it+τ)
2] (3)
where δ is a discount factor and λ and µ are parameters that reﬂect the policymaker’s
preferences. Note that no country-speciﬁc variables appear in the loss function, implying
that the monetary policy authority is interested solely in area-wide developments.
For δ −→ 1 (a scaled version of) the intertemporal loss function can be interpreted as the
unconditional mean of the period loss functions, which in turn is given by the weighted sum
lished in Taylor (1999); in particular, see Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), who apply this approach to the United
States.
15 It has been shown that - unlike optimal rules - certainty equivalence does not hold for simple rules (the
rule is not the same as that for the deterministic problem); in addition, the parameters of these rules depend on the
covariance matrix of the error terms and on the initial conditions of the system (Currie and Levine, 1985, 1987).
16 To test robustness of the ranking, the comparison is carried out changing one or more elements of the
conceptual framework; in particular, different hypotheses are adopted concerning the preferences of the monetary
authoritiesandthe possible effects of uncertainty on the structure of the model, the estimationor calibration of the
modelparameters, andthepresenceofmeasurementerrors(Rudebusch(1998); Orphanides(1998); Peersmanand
Smets (1999)). Other authors compare the performance of various rules across different models of the economy
(Levine et al. (1999); Taylor (1999)).18
of the unconditional variances of the target variables (see Rudebusch and Svensson, (1999)):
Lt+τ = var(πt+τ)+λ · var(yt+τ)+µ · var(∆it+τ) (4)
We restrict attention to Taylor-type rules augmented with a lagged interest rate term, i.e.
rules in which only contemporaneous inﬂation and output gap appear among the arguments.
17
The difference between the AWIB and the MCIB rules is that with the former the policymaker
is assumed to react only to area-wide inﬂation and output gap aggregates (so that the reaction
of the policy rate to a change in any country’s inﬂation and output is given by the average
impact, multiplied by the corresponding country weights). Thus, this rule has three arguments
(it includes the lagged interest rate):
it = γ
A
1 · πt + γ
A
2 · yt + γ
A
3 · it−1 (5)
With the MCIB rule, by contrast, the parameters on the individual countries’ inﬂation




























3 · it−1 (6)
As a benchmark, we also compute the fully optimal instrument rule that depends on all
state variables of the multi-country model (15 in all).
The two competing AWIB and MCIB rules stem from the solution of the following
problems:









t+τ + λ · y2
t+τ + µ · (∆it+τ)2]
s.to: • Multi-country model, and
• eq. (5)
17 As is shown in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), rules of this kind tend to produce an outcome that comes
remarkably close to the one associated with the optimal instrument rule; this will be shown to be also the case for
the experiments carried out below.19
and:













t+τ + λ · y2
t+τ + µ · (∆it+τ)2]
s.to: • Multi-country model, and
• eq. (6)
It is clear from these panels that the performance of an optimal MCIB rule cannot be
worse, by construction, than the corresponding AWIB performance, as the former boils down
to being an unconstrained version of the latter. The issue then is: Given that the MCIB
approach necessarily results in an optimised value of the loss function at least as desirable
as the AWIB approach, are the welfare gains at stake large enough to make it worthwhile to
exploit all available national information?
The variances of the goal variables are of course a function both of the choice of the
parameters in the two rules above and of the variance-covariance matrix of the stochastic terms
in the estimated equation. The latter is given in Table 2. The historical variance-covariance
matrix is rather sparse. Indeed, the results were not perceptibly modiﬁed by introducing the
assumption that the off-diagonal block (i.e., the one that includes the covariances between the
setofthethreeaggregatesupply equationsandthesetofthethreeaggregatedemandequations)
is identically zero.
In addition to minimising the loss function (3) subject to the variance-covariance matrix
of Table 2, following De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001) we repeated the experiments under
the alternative assumption that all stochastic processes belonging to the same diagonal block
are exactly the same; their (common and identical) variance is obtained as an average of the
three corresponding historical variances.
18 This alternative assumption may be viewed as a
very crude, perhaps extreme, way of taking into account the possibility that the euro-area
economies are now more similar than they were in the estimation period.
18 More precisely, as in De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001), the average variances are calculated as squared
weighted sums of the standard deviations of the country speciﬁc Phillips curve and aggregate demand shocks.20
5. The results
The main results of the exercise are reported in Table 3 and Figures 4 and 5. The table
displays the long-run values of the coefﬁcients of the three instrument rules described earlier
(the “Fully optimal” (FO), the “Area-wide” (AWIB) and the “Multi-country” (MCIB)), for
different choices of the weights λ and µ assigned to output gap and interest rate variability in
the loss function.
19 For ease of comparison, the table presents the coefﬁcients assigned both to
area-wide and to country-speciﬁci n ﬂation and output-gap for each rule.
20 Clearly, depending
on the rule, one or the other will be the direct result of the optimisation (in bold) and the
complement will only be implicit. For instance, the implicit inﬂation coefﬁcient for France
in the third row (1.33) is obtained by multiplying the optimised area-wide inﬂation coefﬁcient
(4.86) by the relative weight of Franceout of thetotal three-country aggregate(0.27), whilethe
implicit area-wide inﬂation coefﬁcients in the ﬁrst and second rows are obtained by summing
the three national coefﬁcients (respectively, 2.99=1.61+0.90+0.48 and 3.12=1.45+1.18+0.49).
The table also shows the standard deviations of inﬂation, output gap and interest rate change,
as well as the loss function obtained for each rule. The top panel of Figure 4 shows the
reduction of the loss with the MCIB rule vis-à-vis the AWIB, for wider grids of λ and µ
than those reported in Table 3; the bottom panel expresses this reduction as a percentage of the
difference between the AWIB and the FO losses. Figure 5 presents the optimal inﬂation/output
gap frontiers (in terms of unconditional standard deviations) for both the AWIB and the MCIB
rule and for the fully optimal rule; the frontiers have been computed, for given µ,b yl e t t i n gλ
take a grid of values between 0 (north-west) and 3 (south-east).
A number of insights can be drawn from these results.
Focusing ﬁrst on the ﬁnal outcomes of the policies, the key message is that neglecting
the information contained in individual country developments substantially worsens of the
19 Our choices of the values for λ and µ range from the extreme in which the monetary policymaker is
interested only in inﬂation (λ = µ =0 ) to the opposite extreme, in which the policymaker assigns a very high
cost to deviations of the output gap from its equilibrium value (zero) and to the volatility of the policy-controlled
interest rate (λ = µ =3 ). Assuming λ = µ =0delivers optimal rule parameter values that are not entirely
plausible. By contrast, even a very small weight on interest rate volatility sufﬁces to make the results more
sensible.
20 The fully optimal rule depends on the complete set of the 15 state variablesinthe MCM: this set comprises
inﬂation and output gap in the various countries for different lags. The coefﬁcient on inﬂation reported in Table
4.1 is given, for the fully optimal rule, by the sum of the value of all coefﬁcients that the rule assigns to inﬂation
in all countries and for all lags; similarly for the output gap.21
overall performance of monetary policy. Relative to the AWIB rule, the MCIB rule reduces
loss by between 25 and 50 per cent, except for the case in which both λ and µ are exactly
zero (see Figure 4). The reduction varies with the weights in the loss function and increases
when the relative weight of inﬂation and interest rate smoothness are increased; in particular,
when inﬂation variability and interest rate smoothness are the only concerns, the relative loss
reduction associated with the MCIB rule is between 40 and 50 per cent. The improvement
is statistically signiﬁcant: using parametric and non parametric tests, equality of the two
distributions or of their means was rejected at all signiﬁcance levels. While the loss reduction
would be inﬂuenced by an afﬁne transformation of the loss function, the results can be directly
appraisedintermsofthe(unconditional)standarddeviationofinﬂation, outputgapandinterest
rate changes. Table 3 shows that the MCIB rule reduces the standard deviation by 20-30 per
cent for inﬂation and interest rate changes and by 10-20 per cent for the output gap, compared
to the AWIB. Figure 5 shows similar results: the optimised combination of inﬂation and output
gap variability (for varying relative weights) under the AWIB rule is well to the north-east of
those for the MCIB rule.
A second insight on the overall performance of monetary policy is that the MCIB does
a very good job relative to the FO. This can also be gauged from Figure 5, in which the
frontiers associated with the two rules lie close together. This result recalls the literature on
the performance of simple rules (see, e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)). Indeed, the
MCIB rule loads only 6 variables, compared with 15 for the FO rule, yet delivers quite similar
results.
This naturally shifts the attention to the nature of the rules. A number of noteworthy
features emerge. First, the MCIB and FO rules are always remarkably similar, with few
exceptions for the weights given to German output gap. Second, relative to FO, the AWIB rule
isexcessively “reactive”tobothinﬂation andoutputgap, as theimplied(area-wideaggregated)
coefﬁcients of the former are considerably smaller than those of the latter (between 35 and 45
per cent for the inﬂation, between 10 and 50 per cent for the output gap). Also, the AWIB rule
in general puts too much weight on aggregate inﬂation. Third, Italian inﬂation and output gap
have too much implicit weight in the AWIB rule compared to the FO and MCIB rules, by 3
to 6 times (see Table 3). As to the variables of the other two countries, although their weights
under AWIB differ from those under the FO rule, the order of magnitude of the differences22
is much smaller (usually not exceeding 50 per cent). In particular German variables are both
over-weighted; French inﬂation is over-weighted, and French output gap is under-weighted.
It would obviously be most interesting to trace the various features of the rules back to
speciﬁc features of the individual economies, so as to assess the robustness of the results here
reported. In particular, it would be valuable to understand why the optimal monetary policy —
as represented by the FO or, almost equivalently, by the MCIB rule — deviates so much from
the relative weighting of the countries associated with the statistical procedure of aggregation.
For example, why should the optimal monetary policy reaction to Italian inﬂation and output
gap be so much more muted than would be implied by Italy’s GDP or consumption weight?
This issue is complex. In what follows, let us provide some evidence towards a tentative
assessment of the various factors at play.
Table 4 provides a qualitative picture of the relationships between the structure of the
economies, as captured by our simple model, and the coefﬁcients of the FO rule. Speciﬁcally,
a small positive shock was given to each of the 14 structural parameters of the model and the
derivative of the coefﬁcients of the FO rule was computed; the table indicates the sign of those
derivatives (summarising a large set of numerical results obtained by varying the weights in
the loss function). A few noteworthy regularities emerge.
First, if the inﬂation inertia of one country (the autoregressive coefﬁcient of inﬂation in
the inﬂation equation for that country) increases (maintaining the vertical nature of the Phillips
curve
21), the weights that the FO rule assigns to inﬂation and the output gap in that country
increase. Secondly, if the output gap inertia of one country (the autoregressive coefﬁcient of
the output gap in the output gap equation for that country) increases, the weights that the FO
rule assigns to inﬂation and the output gap in that country increase. Thirdly, if the interest rate
coefﬁcient in the output gap equation for that country increases (in absolute value), the weight
that the FO rule assigns to inﬂation in that country increases, while the weight assigned to
inﬂation in the other two countries tends to decrease (for the output gap the evidence is less
clear-cut). Finally, if the output gap effect on inﬂation in one country increases, the weight that
the FO rule assigns to inﬂation in that country increases (again, the evidence is less clear-cut
for the output gap).
21 This implies that the coefﬁcient of the cross-country effect (e.g. of French inﬂation in the German Phillips
curve) is lowered by the same amount, to keep the sum of the coefﬁcients on inﬂation terms equal to 1.23
The ﬁrst two features hew to a common pattern: any change that increases the inertial
component of target variables is associated with a stronger reaction of the single monetary
policy to the variables in that country. This seems to suggest that a reduction of the monetary
policy “leverage” in one country due to the inertia of the target variables is associated with a
more aggressive use of monetary policy. However, the latter two results suggest that monetary
policy is more reactive to the variables of the country where the transmission of monetary
policy impulses is more effective (either because of its direct effect on the output gap or
because of the the impact of the output gap on inﬂation): an increase of the effectiveness of the
transmission mechanism in one country induces the central bank to concentrate its reaction on
the variables of that country and to reduce the weights assigned to those of the other countries.
On the basis of these remarks, the observed “under-weighting” of Italian variables in
the FO and MCIB rules can be rationalised only in part. Relative to other countries, the
Italian model features a lower autoregressive term in the aggregate demand equation, a lower
coefﬁcient of the interest rate in the aggregate demand equation, and a lower coefﬁcient of the
output gap in the Phillips curve, all leading to a smaller weight on Italian inﬂation and output
gap in the FO rule. However, another feature of the Italian model — the higher autoregressive
term in the Phillips curve — points to the opposite conclusion. At the present stage we can
only observe that the former effects seem to dominate.
T h ew e i g h t sa s s i g n e dt ot h ev a r i a b l e sb yt h eF Or u l ec a nb ee x p e c t e dt od e p e n dn o to n l y
on the structural characteristics of the individual economies, but also on the causal structure
of the euro-area economy as a whole. In this respect, let us recall a result on the control
of dynamic systems obtained by Ando, Simon and Fisher (1963). They suggest that more
effective control of a dynamic system characterised by some form of block-recursiveness is
obtained by reacting more strongly to those variables that come earlier in the causal chain,
since this gives one the bonus of also affecting those that are “downstream”. In the model
estimated, there is a causal structure (by country) that is in fact nearly block-recursive, with
Germany at the root of the chain (affecting French and Italian inﬂation, as well as Italian
output gap), then France, which affects German inﬂation (more weakly) and then Italy. This
pattern would seem consistent with the over-weighting of Germany and the under-weighting
of Italy. Table 4 conﬁrms that increasing the coefﬁcient of the German output gap in the Italian24
aggregate demand equation results in a rule that assigns higher parameter values to German
inﬂation and output gap.
Indeed, if the “cross-country” effects (the coefﬁcient on German output gap and inﬂation
in, respectively, the Italian aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations, the coefﬁcient
on German inﬂation in the French aggregate supply equation and the coefﬁcient on French
inﬂation in the German aggregate supply equation) areput closeto zero,
22 the weights assigned
by the FO rule to the various countries become very close to those implied by the aggregation
weighting scheme.
It may be useful to examine the response of the model to a variety of shocks assuming
policy is set on the basis of the FO, AWIB and MCIB rules, alternatively. This is done in
Figures 6, 7 and 8. The responses of the model under the MCIB and FO rules do not differ
greatly, but the AWIB rule results in visibly more pronounced oscillations.
So far, our reading of the basic result of this paper (that neglecting country-speciﬁc
information in the monetary policy reaction function carries substantial welfare costs) has
taken the FO rule as benchmark. Trying to understand why the FO rule weights country
variablesdifferentlyfromthestatisticalaggregationprocedurehelpstoseewhytheAWIBrule,
which is constrained to adopt the latter relative weighting scheme, underperforms the MCIB
rule, which can come closer to the fully optimal weighting scheme. A somewhat different tack
would be to ask what conditions would attenuate the underperformance of AWIB. Clearly,
one would expect the gap to narrow when the single economies become more “similar”, as
the advantage of the MCIB rule lies precisely in exploiting differences in the working of
the economies. But it is not obvious which yardstick should be used to gauge similarity.
One possibility, following De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001), is to assume that the variance-
covariance matrix of the disturbances converges to some common pattern, thus reducing the
asymmetry of the shocks hitting the various countries. One extreme case of this kind of
“similarity” is tantamount to assuming that the shocks hitting the aggregate demand and the
aggregatesupply equations respectively are exactly the samein allcountries. Figure9 provides
a summary of the results obtained under this extreme assumption: the relative loss reduction
achieved by the optimal MCIB rule (compared to AWIB) is considerably smaller than in our
22 Close, but not exactly equal to zero, since in the latter case the solution algorithm would become unreli-
able.25
benchmark case, and in all cases less than 10 per cent. All rules perform less satisfactorily
than in the experiments in which the historical variance-covariance matrix was assumed to
hold, the worsening being of course much more pronounced in FO and MCIB cases than in
AWIB. A general worsening of the optimised losses should indeed be expected: in this latter
experiment the shocks are perfectly correlated, whereas actual shocks in the past have been
virtually independent, hence not reciprocally reinforcing.
A more systematic investigation of the consequences of convergence is presented in
Siviero and Terlizzese (2002). They ﬁnd that asymmetry of both economic structures and
stochastic shocks is necessary for national information to be of value for monetary policy-
making. However, their investigation of the consequences of partial convergence — in which
the shocks (and the structures) become increasingly similar and more correlated, but not
exactly the same across countries — shows that a rather high degree of convergence must
be reached for the MCIB-rule gains to be reduced by a sizeable amount.
Summing up, it seems that all the features of the economies (their internal mechanisms
as well as their interrelationships) impinge upon the weights of the FO rule and presumably,
though this still remains to be checked, on the weights of the MCIB rule and on the relative
performance of the MCIB rule relative to that of the AWIB rule. Moreover, the nature of the
correlation structure of shocks to single economies also has a bearing on relative performance.
This suggests the importance of thorough empirical inquiry into the properties of the euro-area
economy and of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, an inquiry that, fortunately, has
recently gained momentum both in academia and in the central banking community.
6. Preliminary conclusions and possible extensions
This paperexamineshowmuchtheeffectiveness ofmonetary policy intheeuro areamay
be enhanced by paying attention to national information, as opposed to reacting exclusively
to aggregate area-wide variables. The starting conjecture is that this distinction should be
relevant because of the structural differences between countries. The exercise is based on a
simple aggregate demand-aggregate supply multi-country model for the three main economies
of the area and a standard quadratic loss function of the central bank. While the objectives
in the loss function are expressed exclusively in terms of area-wide aggregates — so that the
exercise is fully consistent with the area-wide orientation of the single monetary policy — the26
arguments of the Eurosystem reaction function (given by a Taylor-type rule) are assumed to
be aggregate values of inﬂation and the output gap or, alternatively, the corresponding national
values.
The main results can be summarised as follows:
– the rule that reacts to individual country information (labelled MCIB) yields results that
are very close to those of the fully optimal rule (FO);
– the MCIB rule delivers large welfare gains with respect to the rule based solely on
area-wide information (AWIB), with loss reductions varying between 25 and 50 per cent,
depending on the preference parameters;
– relative to the FO and MCIB rules, AWIB rule is “over-reactive”, to both inﬂation and the
output gap;
– the general overreaction of the AWIB rule is implicitly far too pronounced for Italy, for
both inﬂation and the output gap, less so for Germany and France.
These results suggest that, from the viewpoint of the optimal monetary policy-making,
the assessment of euro-area economic conditions must pay due care to national developments;
neglecting them can be very costly.
The paper also provides a tentative assessment of the factors underlying the results,
tracing the latter back to the structure of the three economies considered and the causal links
among them.
Overall, the results should not be interpreted as providing speciﬁc indications on the
appropriate reaction of monetary policy to the actual structural asymmetries prevailing in the
euro area. At this stage, the preliminary character of the analysis, as well as the simpliﬁed
conceptual setup, prevent any such interpretation.
23 However, we see our results as making a
clear case for exploiting national information in formulating the single monetary policy.
Several robustness checks need to be done. In particular, we plan to check whether
the gain deriving from the use of national information is sensitive to the class of rules one is
23 For instance, throughout the simulation exercises the model coefﬁcients estimated are taken as given, in
particular those capturing the degree of inﬂation inertia and the slope of the Phillips curve. However, since in
realitytheyare likely to be endogenous, it is not obviousthat the policy maker would like to react to heterogeneity
in these coefﬁcients without closely monitoring their stability.27
considering (for example, forward or backward looking, with richer dynamics, with a larger
conditioning set, etc).
A line of research that is also worth pursuing concerns the speciﬁcation of the loss
function. In place of the traditional quadratic loss function, with the deviation of inﬂation from
the target and the output gap as arguments, one could use a lexicographic approach, whereby
the price stability objective is given the priority that the Statute of the ECB assigns to it (see
Terlizzese, 1999). With a more radical departure from the basic tenet of this paper — only
area-wide objectives are relevant — we could also consider the case in which the Eurosystem
is concerned with variance between countries. Although it is at odds with the Eurosystem’s
description of its strategy, such an attitude would not necessarily conﬂict with the Treaty,
which requires it to “support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to
contributing to the objectives of the Community laid down in Article 2” without prejudice to
the objective of price stability. Among these objectives, one ﬁnds: “to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, ah i g hd e g r e eo f
convergence of economic performance, economic and social cohesion and solidarity among
Member States” (italics added). General as they are, these objectives could in principle imply
that a cost should be assigned to dispersion of economic developments across the area.Table 1
THE ESTIMATED MULTI-COUNTRY MODEL
Equations for: Germany Equations for: France Equations for: Italy






















































R2 0.514 0.635 0.902 0.730 0.960 0.752
R
2 0.483 0.622 0.894 0.720 0.958 0.740
σ 0.411 0.799 0.332 0.443 0.259 0.490
DW 2.160 2.059 2.050 1.888 2.024 1.815
In parentheses: standard error of the coefﬁcients.
In brackets: lag with which the variables enter the equations.Table 2
CORRELATION MATRIX OF STOCHASTIC DISTURBANCES
Aggregate supply Aggregate demand
Germany France Italy Germany France Italy
Germany 1 -0.024 0.035 -0.056 -0.009 0.167
Aggregate supply France 1 0.188 -0.013 -0.128 -0.058
Italy 1 0.182 0.009 0.002
Germany 1 0.387 0.026
Aggregate demand France 1 0.328
Italy 1Area Ger Fra Ita Area Ger Fra Ita
FO 2,99 1,61 0,90 0,48 3,48 1,20 2,00 0,28 0,58 1,23 1,05 0,60
MCIB 3,12 1,45 1,18 0,49 4,58 2,11 1,96 0,51 0,59 1,24 1,08 0,62
AWIB 4,86 2,16 1,33 1,37 4,63 1,97 1,35 1,31 0,76 1,47 1,54 1,03
FO 2,08 1,16 0,67 0,25 2,40 0,78 1,48 0,14 0,75 1,22 0,57 1,04
MCIB 2,21 1,02 0,94 0,25 3,49 1,53 1,45 0,51 0,77 1,23 0,59 1,09
AWIB 3,73 1,66 1,02 1,05 4,72 2,01 1,38 1,33 1,04 1,45 0,84 1,99
FO 2,27 1,23 0,76 0,28 3,94 1,50 2,06 0,38 0,65 1,1 1,21 1,78
MCIB 2,24 1,07 0,89 0,28 4,28 2,05 1,96 0,27 0,66 1,10 1,23 1,81
AWIB 3,90 1,73 1,07 1,10 4,59 1,95 1,34 1,30 0,87 1,25 1,70 2,62
FO 1,83 1,02 0,62 0,19 2,59 0,91 1,51 0,17 0,79 1,15 0,6 2,29
MCIB 1,88 0,88 0,82 0,18 3,38 1,55 1,49 0,34 0,81 1,15 0,61 2,35
AWIB 3,21 1,43 0,88 0,90 4,12 1,75 1,20 1,16 1,10 1,32 0,86 3,68
FO 2,03 1,10 0,72 0,21 4,25 1,66 2,15 0,44 0,71 1,06 1,4 2,93
MCIB 1,98 0,95 0,82 0,22 4,39 2,10 2,02 0,27 0,72 1,06 1,42 2,98
AWIB 3,55 1,58 0,97 1,00 4,77 2,03 1,39 1,35 0,96 1,19 1,89 4,09
FO 1,70 0,95 0,60 0,15 2,76 1,01 1,55 0,20 0,83 1,11 0,63 3,57
MCIB 1,73 0,82 0,76 0,15 3,38 1,58 1,53 0,27 0,85 1,12 0,64 3,64






optimisation; the other coefficients are implicit.
The fully optimal rule depends on the complete set of the 15 state variables in the multi-country model, including inflation and the output gap in the various 
countries for different lags; the coefficients for both inflation and the output gap reported in the table are given by the sum of the coefficients for all lags and, in the case  








λ  = 1







Reaction function coefficients and loss values for the fully optimal, the area-wide, and the multi-country rules
Standard deviation of:
Parameter values in 
the loss function:
Type of rule LossDerivatives of the reaction function coefficients with respect to
the coefficients in the model equations
(1)
Table 4
Germany France Italy Germany France Italy
π g(-1) ++ -- ~ (+/-) + - ~ (+) +
π g(-4) ++ -- ~ (+/-) + -- ~ (+) ~ (+)
yg(-1) ++ -- ~ (+) ++ -- ~ (-) -
yg(-1) ++ +/- +/- ++ - ~ (+/-) -
rg(-2) -- ++ ++ ~ (+/-) ++ ~ (+/-) ++
π f(-1) -- ++ ~ (+/-) -- ++ ~ (+/-) ~ (+/-)
yf(various lags) -- ++ - - ++ - -
yf(-1) - ++ - - ++ ~ (-) -
rf(-2) ++ -- ++ ++ -- + ++
π i(-1) -- -- ++ +/- -- ++ ~ (+/-)
yi +/- -- ++ + -- ++ -
yi(-1) ~ (+/-) ~ (+/-) + + ~ (+/-) + -
yg + ~ (+/-) ~ (+/-) ++ ~ (+/-) ~ (+/-) -










Inflation in: Ouput gap in:
(2) Lags are indicated in parentheses.
(1) "+" indicates that the derivative is slightly positive; "++" indicates that it is positive and comparatively large; similarly for "-" and "--






















































(a) Response of individual country real interest rates (d) Response of euro-area nominal interest rate
(a) Response of individual country and euro-area inflation rates (b) Response of individual country and euro-area output gaps
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(a) Response of euro-area real interest rate (d) Response of euro-area nominal interest rate
(a) Response of euro-area inflation rate (b) Response of euro-area output gap





























































(a) Response of euro-area real interest rate (d) Response of euro-area nominal interest rate
(a) Response of euro-area inflation rate (b) Response of euro-area output gap



















































Percentage reduction in the optimised loss function, MCIB rule vs. AWIB rule
Percentage reduction in the optimised loss function, MCIB rule vs. AWIB rule





























(c) µ =2 (d) µ =3
(a) µ =0.1 (b) µ =1





















































(c) Response of euro-area nominal interest rate
Impulse responses to a temporary Phillips curve shock (+1 s.d. of stochastic terms)
(a) Response of euro-area inflation rate
(b) Response of euro-area output gap










































(c) Response of euro-area nominal interest rate
Impulse responses to a temporary aggregate demand shock (+1 s.d. of stochastic terms)
(a) Response of euro-area inflation rate
(b) Response of euro-area output gap











































(c) Response of euro-area nominal interest rate
Impulse responses to a temporary monetary policy shock (+1 s.d. of stochastic terms)
(a) Response of euro-area inflation rate
(b) Response of euro-area output gap













































Percentage reduction in the optimised loss function, MCIB rule vs. AWIB rule
with identical Phillips curve and aggregate demand stochastic processes in all countries
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